Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? by Ivana Skuhala Karasman
Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins (eds.), Women in Philosophy: 
What Needs to Change? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp. 271.
One of the most famous philosophical texts of the second half of the twen-
tieth century is Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” This paper, 
which argues against materialistic reductionism in philosophy of mind, is 
almost as equally famous for Nagel’s arguments as for its title. So, we can ask 
ourselves what it is like to be any other consciousness agent – on the basis of 
the subjectivity of what it is like Nagel argues that the subjective experience 
of another being capable of having an experience is unreachable for us. We 
can imagine what it is like to be a bat, but we cannot have a bat’s experi-
ence. When I reached for the book titled Women in Philosophy: What Needs 
to Change? one of the first questions that crossed my mind was exactly what 
is it like to be … but this time … a woman (in philosophy)? Oh, I know the 
answer to this question, and that is not unreachable for me; so why did I 
continue reading this book and why did I write a review? The answer is very 
simple: because this question has objective social and structural causes and 
sources in modern societies and philosophical institutions, which go beyond 
my conscious experience.
Why do we still need such a book in which questions about women’s po-
sitions in academic philosophy are raised after all the feministic activities and 
fights for equality with men during the last century? When we look at the data 
presented in this book (“Appendix 1”, pp. 231–252; “Appendix 2”, pp. 253–
259), the reason is obvious. Statistically, the position of women in academic 
philosophy in the last quarter of the twentieth century didn’t change signifi-
cantly, while theoretical philosophy dwelling on the question of gender equality 
and representation obdurately resists any substantial progress in the last twenty 
or thirty years ago, not unlike mathematics, physics, or technical disciplines.
This book raises two central questions on the basis of these statistical 
data and of individual experiences of women involved in academic philoso-
phy: what is/are the reason(s) for this state of affairs, and, accordingly, what 
needs to be changed? The data about women’s representation and influence 
collected and presented in this book reflects the state of philosophy in uni-
versities across the Anglophone part of the world (Australia, USA, Canada, 
Great Britain). Statistical data about the academic position of women in the 
continental philosophical tradition, or geographically in Europe, are not pre-
sented in the book. It would be very interesting to see what the status of 
women in philosophy is in this part of Europe, in which even the very word 
“philosophy” carries with itself a pejorative connotation.
186 Prolegomena 13 (1) 2014
When we try to summarize the problem of women’s position in academic 
philosophy, we can approach this problem from at least two points of view: a) 
personal, and b) institutional. If we translate this bifurcation into sociological 
terms, we can analyze women’s position in academic philosophy at the micro 
level, i.e. in a face-to-face interaction with male colleagues, and at the macro 
level, i.e. within institutional statistics. Nevertheless, both aspects have to be 
taken into consideration for a complete analysis, and indeed the both aspects 
are presented and analyzed in the book.
The initial impetus of this book was the symposium at the Australian 
National University in 2009: the book is a collection of eleven texts that 
discuss several aspects of women’s position in philosophy, starting from the 
question “Why should we care?”, to some structural problems of philosophy, 
such as the problem of method, stereotypes, implicit bias, merit in academic 
meritocracy, pipeline problem, micro-inequities etc. As I mentioned before, 
all of these questions can be approached at the structural level and at the 
level of a direct social interaction. The first dominant explanation of the sub-
ordination of women in the world of academic philosophy is based on the 
specific understanding of Western philosophy as a discipline that has grown 
on conceptual oppositions like reason/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, 
on the one side, and on the negative connotation ascribed to women and to 
characteristics they possess (emotion, lack of rationality, female defectiveness 
etc.), on the other side. Meanwhile this explanation has lost some of its vigor 
because the majority of the arguments supporting it belongs to the history 
of philosophy, which does not play an important role in the contemporary 
analytic philosophy. A further explanation is offered by Marilyn Friedman 
(“Women in Philosophy: Why Should We Care?”, pp. 21–38): she discusses 
the method that is used in academic philosophical argumentation, the path 
from a general philosophical education (discussions group, lectures) to the 
level of academic discussion on philosophical problems. Her argument is that 
this standard philosophical procedure as it is conducted in the majority of 
universities is not appropriate to women. Adversarial method used in all these 
activities is aggressive and this may explain the disproportion in the academic 
achievement between men and women. Besides traditional prejudices toward 
women in philosophy, the underrated position of women in this discipline 
is owed to an implicit bias and stereotype. Those two concepts in combina-
tion with the traditional cultural view of women as creatures of emotion 
rather than of reason secure a better explanation of why it is more difficult 
for women to succeed in academic philosophy. It implies a problem within 
the system of promotion in academic philosophy and opportunity for pub-
lication of papers in top rated journals. Thus, Fiona Jenkins (“Singing the 
Post-discrimination Blues: Notes for a Critique of Academic Meritocracy”, 
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pp. 81–102) questions the meritocratic standards in philosophy based on 
hyper-rationality and blindness of excellence.
Analyses presented in this book suggest several levels of problems en-
countered by women in philosophy. But at the end the question why it is 
important to put questions like these remains open. Why should we care 
about women in philosophy? A possible answer offered in the book is that it 
is because philosophers traditionally should care about fairness and justice. A 
further answer lurking beneath the surface of the book suggest that a meth-
odological and thematic diversity can be stimulating for philosophy itself.
This book is an interesting combination of philosophical discourse com-
bined with the gender studies, sociological and socio-psychological analyses 
by which we gain an insight into the morally ambiguous state of philosophy 
torn between the declared rationality and everyday academic philosophical 
life which is often not based on rational behaviour. This book also provides 
a very inspiring framework for rethinking the self-image that philosophers 
have about their discipline. It also provides some suggestions as to what needs 
to be changed if philosophy cares to become a discipline more hospitable to 
women and more able to benefit from the contribution of women.
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Tema je ove knjige raskorak između ljudskog moralnog i znanstveno-teh-
nološkog razvoja te ona upozorava na opasnosti koje prijete opstanku ljudske 
vrste u modernom svijetu ako se u što skorijem roku ne razviju učinkovite 
metode poboljšanja naših moralnih kapaciteta. Rasprava o moralnom pobolj-
šanju ljudske vrste jedna je od aktualnijih unutar suvremene primijenjene 
etike. Među najistaknutijim zagovornicima moralnog (biomedicinskog) po-
boljšanja nalaze se upravo autori ove knjige: Ingmar Persson i Julian Savu-
lescu iz Centra za praktičnu etiku Oxford Uehiro. Knjiga predstavlja rezultat 
njihova višegodišnjeg bavljenja moralnim poboljšanjem, a prije nje su – što 
